*We acknowledge the exceptional provision of global oilfield data and research sponsorship of energy research company -Wood Mackenzie. The research assistance of H. Reusch and L. Sharifszyanova is much appreciated. Simulation assistance was made possible by Joseph Stanislaw research funding. This paper has been screened to ensure that no confidential data are revealed. Any errors and omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
I Introduction

This study provides insights into an important unanswered Fama and French (1995) question relating to the effect of economic state variables on asset values. Natural resource sector attributes are used to facilitate insights into the behavior of country specific state variables that cause variation in the value of asset holdings. Our study uses oil and gas assets to provide insights into the effects of state participation on asset pricing, a recognition of work by Bekaert and Harvey (2002) and Bruner et al. (2002) who emphasize the need to include the differential effects of country regulations in asset pricing models. Country specificities in state variables are shown to differentially affect the value of global assets, findings that provide insights into the open Fama French question by isolating country specific state variable effects on asset values.
The sector attribute of global oilfield location enables the isolation of the asset pricing effect of country specific asset participation terms. The introduction of the state variable of country specific asset taxation as a proxy for general state participation enables the isolation of movements in the value of asset and state participation in response to oil price shocks. 1 We subject a global sample of oilfields to price shocks, introduce stochastic oil price volatility, and measure state participation and asset value response at each price level. The approach enables us to examine the dual effects of oil price movement and taxation participation on global asset values.
Our sector approach follows prior works by Haushalter (2000) and Haushalter et al. (2002) who highlight the oil and gas sector (O&G) capability to limit the number of model variables and isolate price effects. Jin and Jorion (2006) likewise use the sector to isolate the value of risk management, but, suggest that the sector is exposed to homogenous risks, the evaluation of which assumes equivalent entitlement to proven reserves at all price levels. This is a condition we show does not hold. Prior O&G studies make no distinction between country variant corporate entitlement and 'government take' structures that govern oilfield assets. In this study, the term 'government take'
1 We are grateful to colleagues Joseph Sakovics and Andy Snell for their economic insights and clarification that all forms of taxation and production sharing participation in the increase in oilfield asset values are validly treated as state income, and may therefore in this study, be treated as a state variable. In our exposition, we refer to asset participation as a state variable and oil price as an exogenous stochastic variable is used as understood in the oil and gas industry and refers to all forms of government taxation, whether royalty, profit based or production sharing. Terms are contractual, determined by the entitlement structure, and are usually specific to the regime that the oilfield is located in. Corporate entitlement is the residual oilfield entitlement available to oilfield producers after government take. resources are constrained, both in the sense of specific physical location and with respect to the state taxation variables that are applied to earnings and cash flow. The characteristic of constrained capital flows means that for oilfields, state participation attaches to the asset cash flows, as opposed to the corporate entity, and occurs at or near the oilfield wellhead. This state participation principle of directly linking the field with country taxation terms allows the isolation of state variable effects on asset values, facilitating insights into the first of two open questions proposed by Fama and French (1995) . We are able to overcome Fama and French (1995) concerns with economic state variable measurement by systematically calculating the state participation in each asset according to taxation terms applicable to each field.
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Rational pricing models are based on discounted cash flows that are derived from underlying assets (Ross 2005) . As Fama and French (2002) note, if size and BE/ME risk factors in O&G returns are the result of rational pricing they must be driven by economic state variables that cause changes in asset cash flows that are, in turn, related to size and BE/ME. Several recent studies have focussed on the effects of commodity prices on firm value, and document a relation between stock returns and factors other than overall market returns. This is particularly true for commodity-producing firms, whose stock prices are ultimately associated with changes in asset values in response to movements in the the price of the underlying commodity. Strong (1991) demonstrates a positive relation between stock prices of oil companies and changes in oil prices and Tufano (1996) and Blose and Shieh (1995) establish correlation between the value of gold mining firms and gold prices.
In the period from 1997 to 2005, 90% of global reserve replacement in the oil and gas industry originated from Non-OECD countries (Kretzschmar 2007) . Our asset sample recognise this trend and contrasts with previous oil and gas valuation and risk 2 Wood Mackenzie's Global Economic Model enables the computation of state taxation on a field by field basis.
studies that have treated reserves as a homogenous asset class. Typically oilfields in OECD countries are operated under state concession terms while production sharing contracts occur in Non-OECD areas. An asset based approach has precedent in two important natural resource studies. Brennan and Schwartz (1985) study a single copper mine to evaluate natural resource investment and Paddock et al. (1988) model a single offshore oilfield in order to isolate specific and important real option characteristics.
Our approach enable us to show that oilfield cash flow responses to oil price movements vary widely and heterogeneously based on state entitlement contracts. We also use our analysis to provide insights into the statement by Jin and Jorion (2006, p.915) that O&G asset "delta equivalents can be measured precisely". We provide evidence that corporate oilfield participation is country specific and capable of being accurately determined only with reference to underlying asset holdings. Our paper suggest that differences in state participation are a relevant and necessary consideration in studies of international O&G asset holdings,and provide important insights into the state variable effect on the BE/ME measure of Fama and French (1995) .
Finance theory recognizes that efficient markets require sufficient information to en- 
II State Participation Effects on Asset Values
Firm level valuation studies in the O&G sector have been characterized by two factors.
First, research has tended to relate to a period of oil prices between US$18-US$35, and market volatility characteristics were low. Haushalter et al. (2002) and Jin and Jorion (2006) for instance focus on the effect of price volatility for periods covering very low prices for oil (1992-1994) and (1998-2001) respectively. Second, due to a lack of ownership disclosures, prior studies have been unable to isolate the influence of oilfield ownership structures on asset market risk exposures. Our data attributes allow us to extend prior work by examining O&G state participation in oilfield assets in volatile, high price commodity markets.
Our research enables us to address the above two characteristics of prior studies.
First we examine the O&G assumption of homogenous oil reserve entitlement response to price shocks. All 211 oilfields are valued at three oil price levels; US$22.5, US$45, US$90. Stochastic simulations are introduced to isolate the influence of oilfield ownership structures on market risk at each price level. Secondly, we address the general lack of attention given to price varying asset responses in prior studies. In practice, isolating the oil price response of producer asset holdings is particularly difficult where oilfield cash flows are subject to the simultaneous effects of complex and undisclosed ownership contracts and market uncertainties. This price effect is discussed in depth by , and directly affects the valuation response of oil production and oil reserves. By conducting our analysis over a price range of US$22.5 to US$45 to sharing. 4 In production sharing contracts, state representatives increase state welfare by participating in oilfield asset upside by reducing corporate asset returns and shares in physical oilfield production. PSC Producer oilfield production entitlement depends on contract terms that vary widely, but generally allow cost recovery plus a specified return on oilfields. A production-sharing contract is a contractual agreement between a contractor/producer and a host government under which the contractor typically bears all risk and costs for exploration, development, and production. In return, the contractor is given the opportunity to recover their investment from production (cost hydrocarbons), subject to specific limits and terms. The contractor also receives a stipulated share of the production remaining after cost recovery (profit hydrocarbons).
For concessions, title to the hydrocarbons transfers to the producer at or close to the wellhead. In production contracts the host government retains ownership; however, the contractor normally receives title (after fiscal payments) to a prescribed share of volumes as they are produced. Total, ENI and Shell already have PSC reserves in excess of 30 percent of current holdings, with each of these companies expected to increase PSC holdings to 40 and 50 percent in the next ten years. Exxon's PSC production is for instance expected to move from a low PSC base of 18 percent to 36 percent by 2010 and other oil majors show similar trends (Treynor and Cook 2004) . We use our oilfield data to show that as production sharing oilfields come onstream, the heterogenous response of asset holdings is important in pricing asset value. The findings of this paper are likely to have wide application in the sector and affect the Fama and French (1993) BE/ME measure.
Our findings demonstrate the asset response to underlying economic state variables. Oilfield data are industry standard whole life field data compiled by leading energy research house Wood Mackenzie. All data are derived from publicly available information and operator interviews by Wood Mackenzie oil and gas Research teams. Their specialist teams compile highly-detailed, full life field models, covering development, production and extraction patterns for each commercial oil and gas field. These data contain industry standard oilfield production, oil price, tax and cost data; are typically 5 GoM, UKCS and NCS represent regions within the territorial waters of the USA, UK and Norway. For improved readability and the comparability to countries with PSC regimes, these concession regime regions are referred to as countries throughout this paper. 6 A full list of fields selected is available from the authors on request. 
B Research Objectives
Our comprehensive sample allows us to differentiate between concession and PSC asset price response behavior under commodity price uncertainty for oilfields 'in production'. Jin and Jorion (2006) and Haushalter et al. (2002) . We extend their studies by investigating field value responses to a +100% price up-shock from US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl. We also test field value responses to price down-shocks by −50% relative to the US$45/bbl benchmark.
This split of our analysis into two sub intervals allows us to test whether asymmetries in price responses can be identified. A deterministic present value analysis gives us important insights into how oil fields respond in general to exogenous price shocks.
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The fields' ability to cope with market price uncertainty is analyzed by introducing oil price volatility for each price scenario at the asset level. We simulate each field at each price scenario (211 fields at US$45/bbl, US$22.5/bbl, US$90/bbl) pre-and post-tax. This allows the extraction of pre-and post-tax risk information about the expected mean value of the field, the standard deviation around the mean, skewness and kurtosis. These descriptive measures allow us to compare the regime effect of exogenous price volatility at each price scenario.
We use the term 'deterministic' as representing a present value computation for the oilfield field asset, that given an initial state of valuation of the field, will produce the same final value when given the same valuation inputs 8 We use the term 'stochastic' for oil fields whose behavior is non-deterministic in that the next state of field value is partially but not fully determined by the previous state of valuation inputs, in our study, the oil price. Annual changes in oil prices vary the state of the environment.
C Whole Life Field Model
We develop a whole life oilfield valuation model based on the detailed remaining life field data provided by Wood Mackenzie. Our model is driven by remaining asset estimates of components affecting field value; production (Production), price (Price), cost (Cost) and state taxation participation terms (Tax) under both concession and PSC regimes.
Estimates are annualized.
with
EntitledP roduction t for PSC Regimes (2) and P rice t = Market price per bbloe t, subject to exogenous volatility
Oilfield present values (PV) as to January 2006 are computed based on discounted annual cash flows (CashFlow) at time t with a constant time invariant annual discount rate of 10%. 9 For pre-tax present values (PreTaxPV ), zero taxes with T ax t = 0 ∀ t are assumed in (1). Post-tax oilfield present value estimates (PostTaxPV ) are subject to the corresponding taxation rules.
Foreign oil companies (FOC) in concession regimes are entitled to total remaining reserves (T otalP roduction t ) , as opposed to FOCs in PSC regimes. The annual entitled amount of production (EntitledP roduction t ) for PSCs is defined by:
with a cost of recovery share for the FOC following (5)
whereas the resulting Profit Oil share of total profit after cost recovery is subject to the oil company's contractual agreements. In the case of an internal rate of return (IRR) contract with a specified IRR%, the achievable annually compounded rate of return (ROR) is measured recursively by
Together with
the FOC's Profit Oil share is defined by specified profit splits. For a typical Angolan field, (8) shows the progressive nature of staged profit splits.
The proposed field model enables us to compute the present value price response by varying annual exogenous oil prices in (2) on a field basis. The remaining dependent variables Production, Cost and Tax are populated according to consensus estimates from oil field operators.
D Field Valuation and Risk Analysis
We run separate Monte Carlo simulations at the field level for the whole sample. To estimate frequency distributions of field present value responses pre-and post-tax, we perform 1266 Monte Carlo simulations (211 fields at three price scenarios, pre-and post-tax) with 2500 trials to estimate statistical response measures for each field. 10 Although discrete deterministic analyses provides us with preliminary insights, it fails to capture important dynamics in physical asset responses to price volatility. As stochastic simulation enables risk attribution at its points of origin, discrete price shocks are extended to price shocks with stochastic price volatility as illustrated in Figure 1 . Following insights into the term structure of oil futures prices for the period January 1982
to December 1991, by Bessembinder et al. (1995) we model oil price as a mean reverting function but accommodate recent findings by Geman (2005) , who suggests that arithmetic Brownian motion prevails for the period January 1999 -October 2004. We combine both insights by amalgamating a short-horizon mean reverting oil price trajectory (followed by constant inflation adjustment) with annual lognormally distributed stochastic price volatility. These random price fluctuations are applied to each annualised step of cash flow calculation. We perform this process at each level of price jump as schematically displayed in Figure 1 for the price scenario of US$45/bbl. For our stochastic whole life field simulation, exogenous price volatility follows the continuous probability distribution function of a lognormal price distribution.
The distribution parameters (10) for the mean µ t are linked to the set of three different initial price scenarios for µ 0 at time t = 0. Expected future prices µ t follow the corresponding mean reverting curve for time t (years) as depicted in Figure 1 . Future mean reverting oil prices are derived from the individual field data. A constant relative 10 Monte Carlo simulations using the Latin-Hypercube sampling method with 999 bins are performed over the log-normal price distribution. For all countries apart from the UKCS, each individual field is run with 2500 trials. UKCS fields, in turn, demand intensive and complex taxation calculations and half year cash flow data. Computational intensity forced a reduction of trials to 1000. The error terms remain less than 1 percent for all simulations standard deviation σ t of 30% is applied to retain comparability between simulations.
11 Down-Shock Price Scenario µ 0 = US$22.5/bbl σ t = 30%
Base Case Price Scenario
Stochastic simulation enables us to analyze field responses to changes in price together with variations in moments relative to price movement. We provide information about how the descriptive parameters (mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis) of the estimated present value frequency distribution functions react to changes in oil price and induced exogenous volatility. Insights from cross-sectional analyses have distinct implications regarding the state variable effects on asset BE/ME measures in the Fama and French (1993) framework.
11 Price volatility is based on the one month FOB futures contract implied volatility -for the period January 1986 to January 2006. Annualised volatility showed two distinct periods, pre 2000 (low volatility) and post 2000 (high -above 35 percent) (Geman 2005) . We select 30 percent for our study. This figure illustrates the movement of the future model-implied oil price derived from the individual field data. Building on findings by Bessembinder et al. (1995) , short-horizon mean reverting annual prices are quoted for the three different initial price scenarios (US$22.5/bbl, US$45/bbl, US$90/bbl). We incorporate recent findings by Geman (2005) and apply stochastic lognormally distributed exogenous price volatility to each year's price for all price scenarios under consideration. Prices for the corresponding scenarios are described in Appendix A, Table VIII, Columns 6, 7 and 8.Only one column is applied at a time.
IV Oilfield Price Response Results
A Empirical Asset Valuation Insights and Price Response Analysis
In this section we report insights into whether oilfield asset price responses are specific to state or country contract type or whether oilfield values and risk measures respond heterogeneously to price shocks and volatility. As reported in prior firm level studies, there is a sensitivity of equity values to changes in oil price uncertainty (Strong 1991 ).
Differential response rates at the asset level would provide evidence that firm value studies that treat O&G reserve responses as a homogenous calculation (Jin and Jorion 2006) do not hold across all price ranges. We test the sample response to price variability and use an oil price range of US$22.5/bbl to US$90/bbl to straddle the benchmark of US$45/bbl. The lower part of range covers periods of low oil prices and low oil price volatility comparable to previous studies by Jin and Jorion (2006) and Haushalter et al. (2002) .
Fields in different country regimes with identical cost structures respond differently to oil price variability, an insight that extends previous findings by Haushalter et al. (2002) . Present value responses suggest that oilfields are directly influenced by the state tax regime that they are subject to, a factor not covered in previous finance studies. This enables direct insights into the first open question of Fama and French (1995) . Table II (2000) and Brooks and Del Negro (2002) , suggesting that state entitlement terms and the geographical location of resource holdings are important factors for an accurate valuation of global natural resource assets.
The second asset valuation insight occurs when we compare UKCS pre-and post-tax present values for a change in price from US$22.5/bbl to US$90/bbl. Pre-tax PV price response is 7.67 times (US$M 266 to US$M 2041) and 7.7 times (US$M 138 to US$M 1063.34) respectively. This greater sensitivity and price response is directly in response to higher oil prices allowing a coverage of the higher costs in UKCS fields. Table IIIa measures the relative change in PVs for a relative change in price from US$22.5/bbl to US$90/bbl. The t-test estimates the significance of the difference between pre-tax PV price response and post-tax PV price response. At the 95% significance level, difference can only be observed for one country, Egypt. When we separate the price response analysis into two ranges (Table IIIb) , it is apparent that the price response is asymmetrical and significant differences are obtained for both ranges.
For the range from US$45/bbl to US$22.5/bbl, a range comparable to the prices covered by Haushalter (2000) , Rajgopal (1999) and Jin and Jorion (2006) , a 1% downward change in oil price leads to a relative drop in post-tax PV for all assets. When prices fall, concession pre-tax PV respond to a 1 percent decrease in price by a PV decrease of 0.75% in GoM, 0.63% in UKCS and 0.62% in NCS. For PSC regimes, pre-tax PV respond to a 1 percent decrease in price by a PV decrease of 0.75% in Angola, 0.76% in Indonesia and 0.90% in Egypt. Significant changes from pre-to post-tax response (relative to oil price movement) are experienced in the UKCS and NCS as oil prices go down. For PSC regimes, pre-to post-tax changes are relatively insensitive to falling oil prices, reflected in the 0.93% post-tax change for Angola showing little variation out of line with oil price changes.
Under upward price conditions, measured by a move from US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl, our response rate is 1.3 for the GoM. This field value response is asymmetrical and approximately 1.8 times greater than the relative response under downward price conditions (0.72). For Angola, upward price movements see a relative change in post-tax PV from 0.9 under downward shocks to 0.7 under upward shocks, indicating an asymmetrical PSC present value response. PSC fields share less in the asset value increase caused by the change in price. Asset responses under high oil prices are significantly ). The exception is Indonesia where a number of mature fields have already completed their cost recovery. Flat profit oil splits in the early Indonesian production sharing contracts cause fiscal behavior similar to concessions.
B Response Analysis under Stochastic Price Volatility 2 Differences for Changes in Price
The above deterministic analysis indicates that pre-and post-tax PVs behave differently in response to price changes for both contractual regimes. This important asset valuation insight for the O&G sector supports the intuition of Fama and French (1995) that hidden state economic variables affect asset valuation measures. When oilfields are simulated we also observe distinct state effects driving the differences between preand post-tax simulation behavior. (Haushalter 2000) . The flatter gradient in the Angolan post-tax PV response curve is attributable to progressive profit splits particularly at higher prices. Tax take as a percentage of gross revenue moves for GoM from 27% at US$22.5/bbl to 35% US$45/bbl up to 39% at US$90/bbl. Angola tax take increases from 38% at US$22.5/bbl to 56% US$45/bbl to 73% at US$90/bbl (see Table II for numerical values).
A comparison of stochastic simulations at US$22.5/bbl shows a distinctive overlap in the lower tail of the pre-tax present value frequency distribution and the upper tail of the corresponding post-tax PV frequency distribution. We illustrate this using the GoM and Angolan field as depicted in the center graphs in Figure 2 . At low oil prices of US$22.5/bbl, these characteristics are attributable to low tax-loss offset ratios (Lund 2000) . When comparing the overlay charts at US$22.5/bbl and US$90/bbl (center and bottom charts in Figure 2 ), it is apparent that pre-and post-tax frequency distributions for the GoM exhibit a similar shape, reflecting the linear tax rate of concession regimes.
In the case of Angola the same pre-and post-tax 'concession' symmetry is reflected at US$22.5/bbl. PSC fields at low prices are likely to remain in the stage of cost recovery without triggering progressive profit splits. The distinctive and progressive nature of PSC regimes becomes apparent at high prices. These are depicted in the overlay chart for the Angolan field at US$90/bbl. The distance from the pre-tax mean is influenced by the tax rate and the difference between the distribution means pre-and post-tax. Table IV This effect is overridden for the Angolan sample where small field effects are compensated for by large field positive skewness.
To provide granularity we summarize pairwise field movements between key absolute descriptive metrics for each regime. Table V displays tests for differences in changes of stochastic simulation results for post-tax PV frequency distributions at three price intervals (US$22.5/bbl to US$90/bbl, US$45/bbl to US$22.5/bbl, US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl). Panels A and C display significant differences for all but one descriptive Figure 2 for an post-tax PV frequency distribution of an Angolan field simulated at US$22.5/bbl and US$90/bbl.
All mean responses in Table V display an increase in absolute value for an increase in price. The opposite trend holds for responses in standard deviation (with the exception of PSC fields in the price range from US$45/bbl US$22.5/bbl).
Valuation Differences by State Regime
Regime differences in absolute value responses of descriptive measures with respect to price changes are shown in Table V . For ease of interpretation we aggregate prior country based absolute measures according to regime (Table VI) . We test deterministic absolute present values and descriptive statistics under each price scenario VI. In Panels A and C significant differences between concessions and PSCs are observable for the 3rd and 4th moment of the post-tax present value frequency distribution functions. The exception is Panel B where kurtosis behaves similarly regardless of contract. With Table   VI we construct six charts to display the price varying relationship of deterministic and stochastic measures between contractual regimes in Figure 3 .
The top left chart of Figure 3 displays the present value post-tax PV for both regimes at three price scenarios. Asset values increase with commodity price increases (Strong 1991) . Absolute values of PSC assets are above the value for concession fields at US$22.5/bbl. At the US$45/bbl price scenario convergence between these two average regime values is identified. The linear post-tax increase of concession fields and the degressive response of PSC fields results in concessions having higher absolute value than PSC fields at US$90/bbl. Differential post-tax PV response as between OECD and Non-OECD country holdings directly affects corporate asset values and translates to differential BE/ME measures in the Fama and French (1993) framework. Direct anal- The role of economic state variables is expected to become increasingly noticeable in the oil and gas industry. High oil prices suggesting an asset pricing deviation from the low oil price paradigm prevalent in prior research by Haushalter et al. (2002) and Jin and Jorion (2006) . It is demonstrated that concession response rates increase above those of PSC regimes in the range US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl. Replicating the above response rates (analogous to delta hedging ratios) requires detailed oilfield asset price response data and information about the composition of company asset holdings. This finding is in direct contrast to the statement by Jin and Jorion (2006) that oil and gas delta equivalents are capable of being measured precisely. Specifically, calculating the second, third and fourth moments represented by standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis respectively are important risk attributes. The second moment is significantly different as regards its rate of change between price scenarios measured in Table VII .
The top figure in the right column indicates the convergence in standard deviation as between concessions and PSCs as does the middle figure for skewness (except for the price range US$45/bbl to US$90/bbl where significant differences are observable).
The positive skewness measured in the middle figure occurs as fields 'overcome' their underlying cost structures indicating a higher likelihood of achieving mean present value. In the bottom right chart, the most telling kurtosis difference between regimes is observable. The progressive nature of the state variable of PSC regime taxation occurs at US$90/bbl with production sharing on price upside and reserve recoupment by the operator on price downside. Panels A and C in Table VI illustrate the significance of 
V Concluding Remarks
We use the asset participation principle to provide insights into the unresolved valuation question raised by Fama and French (1995) . Our Fama and French (1995) insights are facilitated by specific oil and gas sector attributes. Oilfields are physical assets with state participation attached to the asset and occurring at or near the wellhead. This attribute allows the isolation of state agent effects on asset values. Evidence is provided that country specific oilfield contractual terms cause divergent and heterogenous asset valuation and risk responses to oil price movement directly affecting BE/ME.
Deterministic and stochastic analyses of oilfields are performed to refine the low oil price paradigm covered in prior valuation and risk studies. We note that research works performed by Haushalter et al. (2002) and Jin and Jorion (2006) Our global study provides asset level insights to the unresolved first question raised by Fama and French (1995) . We show that detailed information about the geographical location of resource holdings and state entitlement terms is necessary for an accurate valuation of global natural resource assets. Market evidence that economic state variables affect risk premia associated with size and BE/ME is a necessary extension to this work. We intend using the results of this global asset pricing study to pursue further market research into specific economic state variables that produce variation in oil and gas sector returns not captured by overall market factors. as agreed between Wood Mackenzie specialist oil and gas researchers and signed off by oilfield operators. Columns 4, 5 and 6 represent the Gross Revenue based on production and price for three mean reverting price scenarios where 4 represents US$22.5/bbl, 5 represents US$45/bbl and 6 represents US$90/bbl. Columns 7 and 8 represent the underlying operational costs and capital expenditures for the field. Columns 9 through to 18 summarize tax and other government takes in respect to the price scenarios for the field. These are differentiated regarding the regime. Columns 19 and 21 represent the field's cash flow attributable to the operating company. Columns 22 and 24 represent the annual total net field cash flows.
( 1 )
( 15 ) ( 16 ) ( 17 ) Panel A (Table Xa) summarizes important descriptive statistics of stochastic post-tax present value simulations at an oil price of US$22.5/bbl. Results were obtained through Monte Carlo simulation with exogenous price volatility at the field level and aggregated to arithmetic country averages. Each simulation is based on log-normally distributed price estimates (see (9) and (10)) and feeds pre-tax present value forecasts through a field specific tax filter in order to estimate a post-tax present value frequency distribution. Panel B and Panel C ( 
